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The Varieties of Capitalism literature has drawn little attention to industrial renewal and 
diversification, while the related diversification literature has neglected the institutional dimension of 
industrial change. Bringing together both literatures, the paper proposes that institutions have an 
impact on the direction of the diversification process, in particular on whether countries gain a 
comparative advantage in new sectors that are close or far from what is already part of their existing 
industrial structure. We investigate the diversification process in 23 developed countries by means of 
detailed product trade data in the period 1995-2010. Our results show that relatedness is a stronger 
driver of diversification into new products in coordinated market economies, while liberal market 
economies show a higher probability to move in more unrelated industries: their overarching 
institutional framework gives countries more freedom to make a jump in their industrial evolution. In 
particular, we found that the role of relatedness as driver of diversification into new sectors is stronger 
in the presence of institutions that focus more on ‘non-market’ coordination in the domains of labor 
relations, corporate governance relations, product market relations, and inter-firm relations. 
 
 
JEL codes: B52, L16, O43, P16, P51 
 








Institutions play a crucial role in market economies, because they help firms to solve complex 
coordination problems with other economic actors in the labor market (Freeman, 2007), the financial 
market (La Porta et al., 1998) and the product market (Nicoletti et al., 2000). Over the last 15 years, 
a literature summarized under the label of Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) has 
investigated the existence and persistence of different institutional arrangements across developed 
countries. The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach claims that the institutional framework in a 
country determines its pattern of economic and technological specialization. Coordinated market 
economies (CME’s), where firms rely on more lasting, non-market relations, would specialize in 
incremental innovations – and in sectors where incremental innovations prevail, as CME’s are more 
characterized by specific assets that cannot be readily put to other use. Liberal market economies 
(LME’s), where firms coordinate their activities through hierarchies and market arrangements, would 
specialize in radical innovations – and in sectors where radical innovations prevail, because they are 
characterized by generic assets (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Empirical studies have found mixed support for these claims (Taylor, 2004; Allen et al., 2006; 
Akkermans et al., 2009; Meelen, 2013). Other deficiencies of the VoC literature are the use of only 
two predefined institutional categories (LME and CME) (Geffen and Kenyon, 2006) that do not 
necessarily fit with mixed market economies (Schneider and Paunescu, 2012) or emerging market 
economies (Kumar et al., 2013), the neglect of inefficiencies and tensions that might exist within 
institutional systems rather than complementarities (Crouch, 2005; Jessop, 2011), the ignorance of 
regional varieties within the same institutional system (Asheim and Coenen, 2006; Gertler, 2010), 
and a preoccupation with institutional stability rather than change (Deeg and Jackson, 2007).  These 
critiques have led to intense debates and stimulated further developments in the VoC framework, like 
a more explicit focus on institutional dynamics (Hall, 2007; Hall and Thelen 2009). In the paper, we 
criticize another aspect of the overly static nature of the VoC approach, like the claim that institutions 




success in radical or incremental innovations (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Little attention has been 
drawn in the VoC literature to the question whether the institutional framework of countries affects 
economic renewal and  particular patterns of industrial diversification. 
Within the field of evolutionary economic geography, there is an expanding literature that 
investigates the intensity and nature of industrial diversification (Boschma and Frenken, 2011). These 
studies show that countries (Hausmann and Klinger, 2007) and regions (Neffke et al., 2011; Boschma 
et al., 2013; Essletzbichler, 2013) tend to expand and diversify in sectors that are strongly related to 
their current activities. Doing so, they claim that the patterns of diversification of countries can be 
explained mostly by the presence or lack of related sectors in the economy: developed countries are 
specialized in products strongly related to many other products and therefore enjoy higher 
diversification opportunities. However, the related diversification approach does not say much about 
the differences that the diversification process can display across countries (Boschma and Capone 
2015; Petralia et al. 2015). More in particular, this literature has ignored the possible effect of 
(national) institutions on the intensity and nature of the diversification process. 
The paper will bring together both streams of literature. What the VoC literature can learn from 
the related diversification literature is adopting a dynamic approach to industrial change. What the 
related diversification literature can learn from the VoC literature is a focus on the impact of 
institutions on the nature of the innovation process. We propose that institutions – and in particular 
coordination institutions that are the prime focus in the VoC approach – condition the direction of the 
diversification process, that is whether countries gain comparative advantage in new sectors that are 
more or less related to their current productive structure. More specifically, our hypothesis is that 
CME’s diversify mostly in related sectors, while LME’s have a higher probability to engage and 
succeed in less related diversification. Our analyses of the diversification process in 23 countries in 
the period 1995-2010 by means of product trade data confirm our hypothesis: relatedness is indeed a 




while countries with institutions typical of LME’s show a higher tendency to move in more unrelated 
industries. 
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, the paper introduces a dynamic element in the 
VoC literature by focusing on diversification rather than on specialization patterns in countries. In 
our approach, institutions determine the direction of diversification, that is whether new sectors are 
related more or less to the existing productive structure. Doing so, we use multiple institutional 
categories to measure the effect of institutions on diversification. Second, the paper introduces 
institutions in the literature on related diversification. While national and regional institutions have 
been recognized as important elements that influence the diversification process, so far their direct 
role in determining the direction of industrial diversification has been substantially neglected in 
empirical studies. In that sense, we also contribute to a wider debate that concerns the role of 
institutions in evolutionary economic geography (Boschma and Frenken, 2009; MacKinnon et al., 
2009; Strambach, 2010; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011; Menzel and Kammer, 2012). 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the current debate on the VoC hypothesis and 
discuss the basic elements of the related diversification literature. In the empirical section, we provide 
some descriptive analysis of the data, and then we present the econometric analysis. We conclude by 
discussing the implications of our work. 
 
2. Varieties of Capitalism and the nature of diversification  
According to the VoC approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001), a firm must establish proper relations with 
other economic actors and solve coordination problems in five domains. The first domain is industrial 
relations: here the coordination problem is about the regulation of wages and working conditions. 
The second domain concerns corporate governance: firms interact with investors to ensure proper 
access to finance. In the product domain, firms have to deal with customers and competitors, in the 




firms, and in the training and education domain, firms must ensure that their incoming workforce 
acquire the necessary skills.  
Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguish between two modes of coordination in the five domains. 
First, firms can use a market coordination mode, which is based on competitive, more fluid markets: 
information diffuse through the price system, and economic actors compete with each other and rely 
on extensive formal contracts. Alternatively, firms can use a strategic coordination mode, which is 
based on networks of relations: information diffuse through private networks, and economic actors 
collaborate with each other and accept incomplete contracts1. Institutional arrangements across 
domains are believed to cluster together, which are called institutional complementarities (Amable, 
2000; Hall and Gingerich, 2009): countries adopting a market coordination mode in a domain tend to 
adopt the same mode also in other domains, and are referred to as Liberal Market Economies 
(LME’s). Alternatively, countries adopting a strategic interaction mode in a domain, tend to adopt 
the same mode also in other domains, and are referred to as Coordinated Market Economies (CME’s). 
Due to the internal logic of each institutional system, Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that “… 
firms and other actors in coordinated market economies should be more willing to invest in specific 
and co-specific assets (i.e. assets that cannot readily be turned to another purpose and assets whose 
returns depend heavily on the active cooperation of others), while those in liberal market economies 
should invest more extensively in switchable assets (i.e. assets whose value can be realized if diverted 
to other purposes)” (p. 17). The dominant institutional arrangement has important implications for 
economic and innovation performance. Hall and Soskice (2001) claim that “the national institutional 
frameworks [...] provide nations with comparative advantages in particular activities and products. In 
the presence of trade, these advantages should give rise to cross-national patterns of specialization” 
                                                          
1 To see how different can be these two coordination modes, consider the domain of corporate governance and the 
problem of getting access to finance. A market coordination mode requires firms to publicly disclose information to 
investors, and this information quickly translates into valuation changes in equity and bond markets, allowing all 
investors to monitor the performance of the companies. In a strategic coordination mode, firms are financed by 
investors that can monitor their performance through private sources of information to which they have access in 
virtue of their being major suppliers or clients, members of the same industry association, part of the supervisory 




(p. 38). They argue that this is true in particular in the innovation domain: LME’s have a comparative 
advantage in radical innovations and a comparative disadvantage in incremental innovations. 
Conversely, CME’s have a comparative advantage in incremental innovations and a comparative 
disadvantage in radical innovations2. 
As a simple test for their hypothesis, Hall and Soskice (2001) compared patents for Germany and 
the United States in 1983-84 and 1993-94, showing that Germany (a CME) specializes in 
technological classes with mostly incremental innovations while the US (a LME) specializes in 
technological classes with mostly radical innovations. Over time, more nuanced tests of the VoC 
Hypothesis have been devised. Allen et al. (2006) used international trade data rather than patent data, 
and found support for the VoC hypothesis. Taylor (2004) extended the analysis to more countries and 
more years, and relaxed the inherent link between a sector and the prevalent type of innovation, and 
found less supportive results. Akkermans et al. (2009) checked the validity of the hypothesis at the 
industry level and showed that it holds only for specific industries.  
According to Hall and Soskice (2001), institutional frameworks have a direct impact on the 
sectors in which countries specialize and, as a consequence, on the type of innovations that occur in 
each country. The link between institutions and innovation is mediated by the sectoral specialization 
of countries and can be decomposed in two parts: first, an association between institutions and sectors, 
and second, an association between sectors and the type of innovations. This double step is, however, 
not straightforward. As noted by Herrmann and Peine (2011), the innovation strategy of firms does 
not depend only on the sector in which they operate, but also on the knowledge base of scientists and 
the characteristics of the national innovation system. The second association, which says that in some 
sectors mostly radical innovations occur, whereas in other sectors incremental innovations prevail, 
has led to intense debates. As pointed out by Taylor (2004) and Akkermans et al. (2009), this 
                                                          
2 There are other institutional approaches that link institutions to the nature of the innovation process. In fact, there is 
a recurrent claim in the literature that some institutional frameworks are more responsive to radical change (see e.g. 




association has been challenged by the industry life cycle approach showing that radical innovations 
characterize the emergent phases of technologies and sectors, while incremental innovations emerge 
in their mature phases (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Klepper, 1996). 
In this paper, we focus on the first association between specific institutions and stable patterns 
of industrial and technological specialization. The original contribution by Hall and Soskice (2001), 
where this association is stated very clearly, has been widely criticized for its overly static approach: 
inspired by game-theoretic analyses of the role and behaviour of firms, they put  a strong emphasis 
on institutional complementarities and the resulting equilibrium in institutional frameworks that 
appeared almost immutable (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Deeg and Jackson, 2007). Reactions to this 
critique have highlighted different forms and paths that institutional change can take, how 
institutional change occurs within the constraints of institutional complementarities (Hall, 2007; Hall 
and Thelen, 2009; Hancké et al., 2007; Strambach, 2010), and how institutional change is driven by 
a plurality of actors, like firms and other entrepreneurial actors, governments (Hall and Thelen, 2009), 
and marginalized or hegemonic social forces (Jessop, 2011). Most often, these actors stretch the limits 
of institutions to deal with challenges within a specific industrial sector or geographical location 
(Strambach, 2010). In this dynamic VoC framework, institutions and the related strategies at the firm 
level are seen “…. not as a set of [...] differences fixed over time, but as bundles of [...] practices that 
evolve along distinctive trajectories” (Hall, 2007, p. 40).  
However, this shift of focus towards institutional change has not led to an interest in the evolution 
of industrial structures in the VoC literature: even in the dynamic version of the VoC framework, 
there is little room for industrial dynamics and change. Recently, a new stream of literature has 
investigated the evolution of the industrial structure of regions (Neffke et al., 2011; Boschma et al., 
2013) and countries (Hausmann and Klinger, 2007). These studies show that territories are 
continuously experiencing the introduction of new technologies, products and sectors through a 
process of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1939; Martin and Sunley, 2006; Boschma and Frenken, 




process, in which a new sector spawns from a related sector (Klepper and Simons, 2000) or from the 
recombination of capabilities from multiple, related sectors (Klepper, 2002). The related 
diversification theory also suggests the existence of cross-country differences: since relatedness 
drives the diversification process, developed countries with many related products enjoy higher 
diversification opportunities than underdeveloped countries (Hidalgo et al., 2007), and the effect of 
relatedness on diversification might not be the same in countries with different levels of economic 
development (Boschma and Capone, 2015; Petralia et al. 2015). 
However, this related diversification theory has no clear implications about the existence of 
differences between different groups of countries at similar stages of development. Related to that, 
the related diversification literature has made no attempt to include institutions in empirical studies. 
While national and regional institutions have been recognized as important elements that influence 
the innovation process (Nelson, 1993; Feldman and Massard, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 
2014), so far their direct role in determining the diversification process in general, and the direction 
of industrial diversification in particular has been neglected in empirical studies. 
The VoC approach provides the opportunity to explicitly introduce institutional elements in the 
analysis of the diversification process. We propose that institutions determine the direction of the 
diversification process, that is whether new emerging sectors and technologies are more or less related 
to the existing productive structure of a country. In LME’s, we expect a weaker effect of  relatedness 
on product diversification, as they favor more mobile and switchable assets. Here firms can gain more 
easily access to credit on financial markets and by venture capitalists which favors the establishment 
of new enterprises in non-related fields. A less specialized and more mobile workforce reduces the 
costs of moving to new unrelated sectors. Market based inter-firm relations allow firms to enter 
distant fields by acquiring already established firms or by licensing new products. Weakly regulated 
product markets reduce the probability of legal obstacles to the introduction of new products as well 




In CME’s we expect an opposite pattern, that is a stronger role of related diversification, because 
of the prevalence of specific and co-specific assets. This comes close to the claim of Menzel and 
Kammer (2012) that the formation of new industries is expected to be more tightly connected to 
established resources and industries in CME’s. A specialized labor force can be more easily 
redeployed in closely related sectors. A financing system based on internal resources and consensus 
decision-making favors the choice of expanding into related rather than unrelated sectors. Inter-firm 
collaborations based on direct and repeated interactions favor the exchange of sector-specific 
information and the development of new related products. And heavily regulated product markets 
increase the value of legal knowledge in closely-related sectors and increase the costs of expanding 
in distant sectors. 
Summarizing, our framework introduces dynamics in the VoC approach, by looking at the 
dynamic process of diversification rather than static specialization patterns in different institutional 
systems. And our approach introduces institutions in the related diversification literature, by looking 
at the impact of the overarching institutional framework on the nature of diversification, in terms of 
whether related rather than unrelated diversification prevails in countries. 
 
3. Descriptive Analysis 
In the previous section, we highlighted the strong association between institutional frameworks and 
the emergence and persistence of specific sectors, as proposed by VoC proponents. In this section, 
we test whether there is any evidence of such an association, by looking at the patterns of sectoral 
specialization and diversification of countries. 
Such an analysis requires a dataset with specific features: it must be fine-grained in terms of 
product categories, it must allow cross-country comparisons, and it should guarantee an adequate 
time coverage. Two types of data satisfy these conditions in particular: patents and international trade 
data. In this paper, we employ international trade data over an extensive range of years: the NBER-




(Gaulier and Zignago, 2010)3. There are good reasons to prefer trade data to patent data. Patents are 
a measure of invention rather than of innovation: it can be argued, instead, that successful innovation 
in sectors must reflect itself in the ability of countries to gain a comparative advantage in the 
production and the export of products (Berger, 2013). Empirical evidence consistently shows that in 
advanced countries, the innovative activity affects the dynamics of international trade market shares 
(Fagerberg, 1988; Dosi et al., 1990). Moreover, the advantage of using trade data is that renewal in 
the whole economy can be covered, while using patent data restricts the diversification process to 
high-tech industries only. Finally, and this is particularly relevant, the VoC arguments can be applied 
to the specialization and diversification patterns of the whole economy, and not only to the innovation 
domain. 
A basic measure we compute from trade data is a revealed comparative advantage index for each 
country in each product category and in each year. A country has a comparative advantage in a 
product i (xi,c,t = 1) when the share of this product in its exports is larger than the share of the product 
in the world exports (Balassa, 1965). The revealed comparative advantage is computed at the most 
detailed level of products available from current trade data, which is 4-digit for data from 1970 to 
2000 (1,006 products) and 6-digit for data from 1995 to 2010 (5,018 products). 
 
3.1 Specialization patterns of countries 
To get a first impression of industrial change in countries, we look at the persistence of their 
specialization patterns in the period 1970-2010.  We put each product category in our data4 into one 
of three groups. These broad categories and their correspondence to SIC codes are taken from 
Akkermans et al. (2009): (1) products that should be characterized by radical innovation and should 
                                                          
3 Both databases are based on United Nations official data. Full documentation about the data is available at the NBER 
website for the NBER-UN database and at the CEPII website for the BACI database. 
4 Official correspondence tables are used to link trade data codified by SITC (1962-2000) or HS (1995-2010) codes to 4-





be mostly present in LME’s (LM products). They include agriculture, food, electronics, aerospace, 
telecommunications, scientific instruments and biotechnology; (2) products that should be 
characterized by incremental innovation and should be mostly present in CME’s (CM products). They 
include chemistry, drugs, machinery, electrical equipment, transportation and weapons; (3) all other 
products. Although other classifications of products and sectors are possible – for example, Pavitt’s 
(1984) classification by technological levels or Leamer’s (1984) classification by factor intensities – 
the broad categories identified by Akkermans et al. (2009) are particularly convenient because, on 
the basis of the assumptions of the VoC literature, they should be associated with specific groups of 
institutions and countries. 
We consider four time periods (1971-1980; 1981-1990; 1991-2000; 2001-2010)5. For each 
period, we include a product category in the productive structure of a country if that country keeps a 
comparative advantage in the product for more than half of the period. Then, we compute the share 
of product categories in each of the three product groups (LM products, CM products, other products) 
and use it to build a specialization index in each of them. If a country has a share of product categories 
in a group larger than the share of all product categories in that group, the index takes positive values 
(between 0 and 1). Otherwise, it takes negative values (between 0 and -1). The presence of a third 
category makes sure that any relation between LM and CM specialization is possible. Figure 1 
represents the specialization index in LM and CM products (on the horizontal and vertical axis 
respectively) for 23 developed countries to which Hall and Soskice (2001) refer (see Table A2 for a 
list of the countries). We use these countries to make our analysis directly comparable to Hall and 
Soskice (2001) work. 
If the VoC hypothesis is correct, we should observe a graph with the following characteristics. 
First, there should be a negative relation between LM and CM specialization. Second, LME countries 
should cluster in the fourth quadrant and CME countries should cluster in the second quadrant, while 
                                                          




the first and the third quadrant should be relatively empty. Third, this relation should be stable over 
time, because driven by the association between institutions and sectors.  
During the seventies and the eighties, the first two requirements are satisfied. There is a negative 
relation between LM and CM specialization. Most LME countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New 
Zealand) are located in the fourth quadrant, while many CME countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) are located in the second quadrant or very close to 
it. The United States are the only country in the first quadrant. There are also some notable exceptions, 
though. Three CME countries (Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands) are in the fourth quadrant, while the 
UK is in the second quadrant. 
In the following decades, the relation becomes weaker though. This dynamics is driven mostly 
by the movement of several countries from both the fourth quadrant (Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland) 
and the second quadrant (Belgium, France, Japan, Switzerland, UK) towards the first quadrant. This 
shift is at odds with the assumption of a strong association between national institutions and sectors. 
This still could simply reflect institutional change: countries changing institutions might also show 
changing specialization patterns. Schneider and Paunescu (2012) actually showed that in the 1990s, 
some countries (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland) moved from a CME to a LME 
framework. In Figure 1, three of these countries moved towards the first quadrant. In the moving 
group, however, there are also countries with little institutional reforms, such as France or Ireland. 
More importantly, institutional change could explain only movements along the LM-CM relation 
curve, while in reality, we observe mostly movement towards the first quadrant, which reflects a 
weakening LM-CM relation. 
Another possible explanation of this changing pattern refers to the industry life cycle approach 
(Klepper, 1996). If the characteristics of sectors change over time, involving a shift from radical 




because of a misallocation of sectors in LM and CM categories6. While we think that the industry life 
cycle approach correctly identifies some limitations of the VoC approach, it cannot alone explain the 
pattern we observe in Figure 1. Given the empirical evidence regarding the industry life cycle, we 
would expect mostly sectors that should be under the CM label, but are wrongly allocated to the LM 
category. Therefore, the misallocation hypothesis implies that the weakening LM-CM relation is 
driven by the presence of CME countries in the first quadrant, while LME countries should not be 
affected by this. In the 2000s, we actually observe 5 countries in the first quadrant and 5 countries 
very close to it: four LME countries (Canada, Ireland, UK, US), two countries not classified in the 
two main groups (France, Spain), and four CME countries (Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Norway). Moreover, two of the CME countries (Denmark, Netherlands) actually exhibit an increase 
in CM (and not LM) specialization. Therefore, while we cannot exclude some misallocation of sectors 
in the LM and CM categories, this cannot alone explain the specialization patterns we observe. 
 
3.2 Diversification patterns of countries 
Besides specialization patterns of countries, we look at diversification patterns of countries over time. 
If the VoC literature is correct, we would expect LME’s to diversify mostly in LM products, while 
CME’s would diversify mostly in CM products.  
We consider again the four periods. A country diversifies into a new product if that product is 
part of the productive structure in the current period, but not in the previous period7. A product is 
included in the productive structure of a country if that country keeps a comparative advantage in the 
product for more than half of that period. For each of the three product groups (LM, CM and other 
products), we computed the probability of diversification as the ratio between the number of product 
categories in which diversification occurred and the number of product categories in which 
                                                          
6 We thank one anonimous reviewer for this observation. 





diversification could have occurred. Finally, we built a diversification index in each of the groups by 
using the normalized ratio between the probability of diversifying in the group and the general 
diversification probability of the country. Positive values of the index (between 0 and 1) indicate a 
higher probability of diversification in the products belonging to the group. 
The diversification index in LM and CM products is presented in Figure 2. It shows 
characteristics remarkably similar to those of the specialization index in Figure 1. In the 1970s and 
partially also in the 1980s, it is possible to identify two distinct clusters of countries. A first group 
(including Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland) diversifies mostly in 
CM products, not in LM products. A second group of countries (including Australia, Denmark, 
Ireland, New Zealand, Netherlands, Turkey, and United States) diversifies mostly in LM products 
and not in CM products. Over the 1980s, some countries (notably France, Japan and the UK) shift 
their diversification pattern from CM to LM products. Also in this case, the negative relation between 
LM and CM diversification disappears. In the last decade, almost all countries group around the first 
quadrant, showing strong diversification in both LM and CM products. 
In sum, our findings on the dynamics of specialization and diversification patterns of countries 
challenge the strong assumption of the VoC literature of a stable association between institutions and 
sectors. Our finding of a changing LM-CM relation suggests that overarching institutional 
frameworks play little or no direct role anymore in the selection of the sectors in which countries 
diversify: it is not the case that LME’s diversify mostly in LM products, while CME’s diversify 
mostly in CM products. If so, the question remains whether institutions, as defined in the VoC 
framework, still matter in the process of diversification. We hypothesize that relatedness is a stronger 
driver of diversification into new products in CME’s, as compared to LME’s. To be more precise, we 
investigate whether CME countries diversify mostly into related products (and not necessarily CM 
products), and whether LME countries can make bigger jumps in their industrial evolution, and thus 





4. Econometric Analysis 
The descriptive analysis presented in the previous section showed strong dynamics in the 
specialization and diversification patterns of countries, in contrast with the assumptions of the VoC 
approach. The related diversification theory offers an alternative perspective to explain such patterns, 
based on the idea that countries diversify into related sectors, but this theory is quite silent about 
differences in the diversification process across countries or any role that institutions might play in 
it. In the theoretical section, we proposed that relatedness is a stronger driver of diversification into 
new products in CME’s, as compared to LME’s. In this section, we empirically investigate whether 
CME countries diversify mostly into related products (and not necessarily CM products), and whether 
LME countries diverisfy mostly into unrelated products (and not necessarily LM products). 
Our empirical analysis of diversification based on relatedness requires two basic measures. First, 
we need a metric to determine how similar products are. Second, we need to measure the distance of 
countries to products, in order to observe whether their productive structure changes towards related 
or unrelated products. These two elements are provided by the methodological toolkit developed by 
a set of quantitative studies applying network analysis to the study of related diversification 
(Hausmann and Klinger, 2007; Hidalgo et al., 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). 
The first element is the concept of proximity between two products. The proximity (ϕ) between 
two products (i and j) in a given year t can be formally expressed as: 
 
𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑃(𝑥𝑖,𝑡|𝑥𝑗,𝑡), 𝑃(𝑥𝑗,𝑡|𝑥𝑖,𝑡)}                                   (1) 
 
which says that the proximity between product i and j in year t is the minimum between the 
conditional probability of having a revealed comparative advantage in product i given a revealed 
comparative advantage in product j, and the conditional probability of having a revealed comparative 
advantage in product j given a revealed comparative advantage in product i. The rationale behind the 




infrastructure, productive inputs, capabilities, and technology, they will be more likely to be produced 
together. Conditional probabilities rather than joint probabilities are used, so that the measure is not 
affected by the relevance of the products in the world trade. The minimum between conditional 
probabilities is used in order to ensure a symmetric and conservative measure. 
The second element is a density indicator that measures how close a product is to the current 
productive structure of a country. Formally, density can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑥𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 ∙ 𝜑𝑖,𝑘,𝑡𝑘
∑ 𝜑𝑖,𝑘,𝑡𝑘
                                                                              (2) 
 
where ϕ represents proximity (between product i and product k) and x takes the value of 1 if country 
c has a comparative advantage in product k at time t, and zero otherwise. So, density around a product 
will be high if a country has a comparative advantage in most of the products related to the focal one. 
At the extreme, it will be equal to 1, if a country has a comparative advantage in all products with a 
non-zero proximity to the focal product. Conversely, density around a product will be low (zero) if a 
country does not have a comparative advantage in most (any) of the products related to the focal one. 
The proximity and density indicators are computed using country-level world trade data from the 
BACI database for the period 1995-2010 (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010)8. We use 4-digit level data 
which includes 1,241 different products9. Summary statistics and correlations on comparative 
advantage and density, as well for all other variables in our analysis, are provided in Table A1. 
Following previous studies on related diversification (Hausmann and Klinger, 2007; Boschma et 
al., 2013), we study the probability of gaining a comparative advantage in a given sector as a function 
of a comparative advantage in the past in the same sector and the density indicator. To better capture 
                                                          
8 We limit our analysis to this period, because most of the institutional indicators developed within the Varieties of 
Capitalism literature refer to the early 1990s. 
9 We use 4-digit rather than 6-digit data because the computation of conditional probabilities is highly demanding for 
computer memory. However, our analysis is still more fine-grained than what can be found in other studies: 




the effect of density on the entry into new sectors, we separate it from the effect of density on the 
retention of current sectors, by interacting density with dummy variables indicating whether a country 
had already a comparative advantage in the product or not. 
Since high density indicates low distance of a product to the productive structure of a country, a 
positive effect of density is evidence that countries diversify into related products. Our hypothesis 
about VoC institutions is that the institutional characteristics of countries strengthen or reduce the 
impact of related diversification. Therefore, the impact of density should differ across countries 
according to their institutional characteristics. A test for this hypothesis can be obtained by interacting 
the density measure with an institutional indicator: a positive sign of the interaction term indicates a 
stronger effect of density in presence of the considered institutions, while a negative sign indicates a 
weaker effect of density. Obviously, a non-significant effect is also possible, signaling the existence 
of no difference in the effect of density across countries. In our analysis, we use multiple institutional 
indicators: their summary statistics and correlations are provided in Table A1, while a short 
description and reference to the data sources are provided in Table A2. The direct effect of 
institutional characteristics – both at the national and the sectoral level – on comparative advantage 
is taken into account by including country-year and product-year fixed effects. 
Formally, we estimate the following econometric model: 
 
𝑥𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+5 =   𝛼 + 𝛽0 ∙ 𝑥𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑚 ∙ 𝑥𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑛 ∙ (1 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑐,𝑡) ∙ 𝑑𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 
+ 𝛾𝑚 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝑥𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛾
𝑛 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑐,𝑡) ∙ 𝑑𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 
+ 𝛿1 ∙ 𝑙𝑖 ∙ 𝑑𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛿2 ∙ 𝑐𝑖 ∙ 𝑑𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋 + 𝑖,𝑐,𝑡    (3) 
 
where the dependent variable takes value 1 if country c has a comparative advantage in product i at 
time t + 5 and zero otherwise10, 𝑑𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 denotes the density
11 around product i in country c at time t, Inst 
                                                          
10 We follow past studies that use a 5-years time lag. 




is the institutional indicator measured in the specific context, and X is a vector of country-year and 
product-year dummy variables, which control for any time-varying country or product characteristics. 
Since we estimate separately the effect of density on gaining a comparative advantage (𝛽𝑛) and on 
retaining a comparative advantage (𝛽𝑚), we focus attention on the coefficients 𝛾𝑚and 𝛾𝑛, that capture 
any difference in the impact of density on having a comparative advantage in current and new 
products, depending on the level of the institutional indicator.  
As mentioned in the previous section, an alternative driver of diversification could be the 
association between institutions, sectors and types of innovation, as assumed by the VoC literature. 
Adapting this assumption to the context of related diversification, if a stronger or weaker role of 
density is related to specific types of products, and in particular to product categories associated with 
LME and CME, we might attribute to institutions an effect that is actually driven by product 
characteristics and country product specialization. To control for this effect, we include in our 
regression model an interaction between density and product categories, distinguishing between 
products typically associated to LME (𝑙𝑖) and products typically associated to CME (𝑐𝑖), as before. 
We estimate our model by using OLS with standard errors clustered at the country level. We use 
OLS rather than limited dependent variable estimators because of the incidental parameters problem 
rising in presence of a large number of dummy regressors (Heckman, 1981; Greene, 2004). In these 
conditions, a linear probability model is more advisable because non-linear models produce biased 
and inconsistent estimates of all parameters, whereas average effects obtained from the linear model 
are quite similar to marginal effects from non-linear models (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Riedl and 
Geishecker, 2014). Further complications arise in non-linear models because the computation of 
marginal effects depends on distributional assumptions about the unobserved heterogeneity captured 
by fixed effects, because results are quite sensitive to misspecification errors, and there is no 
straightforward interpretation of interaction terms. The presence of the lagged dependent variable 




analyses, since the fixed effects are computed for each time period, exploiting the variation in the 
country and product dimensions. 
 
4.1 Results: Dummy institutional indicators 
The first and most simple indicator we use to test our hypothesis is the classification of countries in 
the three categories of Liberal Market Economies (LME), Coordinated Market Economies (CME) 
and Mixed Market Economies (MME), provided by Hall and Soskice (2001)12. We would expect to 
find a negative effect of the interaction variable between density and institutions for LME’s, a positive 
effect for CME’s, and no effect for MME’s. 
Table 1 reports the results of our regressions. As expected, density has a positive effect both on 
keeping a comparative advantage in current products and on developing a comparative advantage in 
new products. The variables controlling for the VoC hypothesis have no significant effect. The 
interaction coefficients between density and institutional indicators have the expected signs, and are 
bigger in the case of new products, but they are far from being statistically significant. One possible 
reason for this result is that institutions actually changed over time, especially during the period under 
analysis. Schneider and Paunescu (2012) provided detailed evidence about such changes and built a 
more refined taxonomy of institutional varieties, employing 5 categories (instead of 3), and allowing 
countries to change category over the years13. We considered this detailed taxonomy in the models 
reported in Table 2, but again we did not find the expected results: the interaction coefficients were 
never significant. 
 
4.2 Results: Corporate governance and labor indicators 
                                                          
12 Hall and Soskice (2001) consider 23 countries and we use the same countries in our analysis. See Table A2 for a list 
of the countries. 
13 Schneider and Paunescu (2012) add Czech Repubic, Hungary, Poland, and South Korea to the 23 Hall and Soskice 
(2001) countries, but exclude Iceland. We run our analysis including  also Iceland and we classify it into CME’s (as in 




The use of predefined categories, where countries are forced to belong to one of the “ideal type” 
groups without any quantitative measurement of institutional variables, has been criticized in the VoC 
literature, because it is too coarse as a measure for institutional variation (Geffen and Kenyon, 2006). 
The debate about how to measure institutions extends well beyond the VoC approach. An extreme 
view considers only objective rules as acceptable institutional measures (Glaeser et al., 2004), but 
this leaves out the analysis of informal rules or the actual enforcement of formal rules that might have 
more impact on economic and social outcomes (Woodruff, 2006; Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2012). In 
the case of broad institutions, which are theoretically meaningful but not directly observable, Voigt 
(2013) has suggested the use of factor analysis over observable variables. Using such approach, Hall 
and Gingerich (2009) has provided detailed indicators for 20 countries for what are considered the 
two most important institutional domains in the VoC approach, since they directly impact on the 
supply of labor and capital: labor relations and corporate governance relations. Both indicators are 
normalized to be between 0 and 1, and take higher values in presence of strategic coordination 
mechanisms and  lower values in presence of market coordination mechanisms14. 
The debate about how to measure institutions has important implications also for the selection of 
the countries to analyze. There is actually a trade-off to consider in selecting the countries for our 
analysis. On the one hand, increasing the number of countries might improve the robustness of the 
analysis: the lower the number of the countries, the higher the impact that each country (and its 
specificities) has on the results. In our econometric analysis we try to account for the impact of 
country specific characteristics by using country-year fixed effects and country-clustered standard 
errors: this mitigates the issue, but it does not solve it completely. On the other hand, increasing the 
number of countries comes at a cost: institutional indicators available for a higher number of countries 
                                                          
14 For the value of the indicators for each country, see Hall and Gingerich (2009), Table 2, p. 458. The variables 
employed in the factor analysis are: shareholder power, dispersion of control, size of stock market, level of wage 
coordination, degree of wage of coordination, labour turnover. Details and sources about these variables can be found 




are in general less precise and based mostly on formal, objective rules15. Formal rules might fail in 
capturing the actual incentives that institutions generate and might be even deceiving if they act as a 
substitute of effectiveness16.  
In the models reported in Table 3, we consider the two indicators developed by Hall and 
Gingerich (2009) as our institutional variables and we limit our analysis to the countries for which 
these indicators are available17. We consider each of them separately (model 1 to 4), and then the 
combination of a summary indicator obtained from principal component analysis (model 5 and 6). 
We avoid the inclusion of both variables in the same regression because of their high correlation 
leading to multi-collinearity issues. In each case, we consider both the continuous indicator and a 
dummy variable that splits the countries in two groups around the median. While the first method 
captures the existence of a linear effect of our institutional variables, the second method is useful to 
detect the existence of non-linear effects. For example, some institutions might generate an effect 
only above or below a certain threshold. Moreover, this second method allows an easier interpretation 
of the coefficient, that indicates the difference in the effect of density across the two groups of 
countries. 
In all cases, we obtain positive and significant coefficients for the interaction between 
institutional indicators and density in new sectors. Since higher values of the institutional indexes 
indicate non-market coordination in the labor and corporate governance domains, these results 
support our hypothesis. In terms of size, the effect is also relevant: moving from the group below the 
median to the group above the median implies an impact of density on the development of 
comparative advantage into new products that is 26% stronger in the case of labor relations, 16% 
                                                          
15 By formal, objective rules we refer to de jure institutions, as formally specified in legislation and distinct from how 
they are factually implemented. As Glaeser et al. (2004) put it, “it is certain that ‘rules on the books’ are very different 
from what actually takes place in a country” (p. 276). 
16 That is, we might observe stricter regulations in countries where enforcement is weaker, or some rules might be 
explicitly stated in countries where citizens are less inclined to follow them. For example, formal vocational training in 
the school system might be stronger in countries where firms do not provide it to their workes. 
17 For an analysis of institutions and diversification using a different set of institutions and a larger set of countries, see 




stronger in the case of corporate governance relations, and 32% stronger in the case of our combined 
indicator18.  
 
4.3 Robustness checks: Further institutional indicators 
Apart from labor relations and corporate governance relations, there are also other relevant 
institutional domains that may be more or less effective in driving related diversification: product 
market regulation, inter-firm regulations, and training systems. The use of indicators referring to these 
institutional domains allows us to perform a robustness test of our hypothesis, because we can extend 
the analysis to some institutional aspects that are theoretically relevant in the VoC framework, and 
because these additional institutional measures are derived from other data sources. 
As an indicator of product market regulation, we consider an index (PMR) constructed by 
Nicoletti et al. (2000), which is a summary measure of 17 product market regulation in 1998. Higher 
values indicate stronger market regulation that increases the costs of entering new unrelated markets. 
For the inter-firm relations domain, we consider two measures. First, we use an indicator of 
mergers and acquisition (MA), expressed as the ratio between the sum of M&As in a country and its 
population between 1990 and 1997 (Pagano and Volpin, 2001). Higher values of M&A in a country 
indicate the prevalence of market mechanisms in the realm of inter-firm relations. However, M&As 
capture only a specific segment of the inter-firm relations. Therefore, we also use an index of firm 
cooperation (FCO) developed by Hicks and Kenworthy (1998). This is a summary measure of 
multiple indicators of firm collaboration between 1960 and 1989 which is available for 18 countries. 
Higher values of this indicator imply the use of more cooperative practices adopted by the firms in 
their relations. 
                                                          
18 Recall that 𝛽𝑛 measures the effect of density on gaining a comparative advantage in a new product and 𝛾𝑛 captures 
the difference (if any) in the impact of density on gaining a comparative advantage in a new product depending on the 
level of the institutional indicator. When we use the dummy structure for the institutional indicator, 𝛾𝑛 captures the 
additional effect of density on gaining a comparative advantage in a new product that is experienced by countries 
belonging to the group with a high value of the institutional indicator. In this case, the relative size of the effect can be 




Finally, we include an indicator of characteristics of the training system (VCT), which is given 
by the ratio between students enrolled in vocational training program at the secondary and tertiary 
level, and all students enrolled in the same cohorts. A higher share of vocational training creates a 
future workforce more specialized in the current production of a country. 
We estimate separately a model for each indicator due to the high correlation between them, 
using the same countries as in the previous section19. In Table 4, we present results from the 
estimation of Equation (3). Most results are in line with our expectations. Again, the institutional 
effect is concentrated mostly on the entry into new products, although we find a positive effect in 
current products in the case of product market regulations. The effect of density is stronger in presence 
of tighter product market regulations (Models 1 and 2) and more cooperative firm practices (Model 
5 and 6), and it is weaker when inter-firm collaborations are performed mostly through competitive 
M&As (Model 3) The negative sign of the M&A indicator is coherent with our hypothesis, since 
higher values of the M&A indicator reveal the presence of market coordination mechanisms. We 
found a negative and significant effect of vocational training (Model 7) which goes against our 
expectations, but this effect is not robust to a different specification (Model 8). This result might 
signal the weakness of our indicator of vocational training, which does not capture the role played by 
firms in the development of the workforce skills (Gospel, 2013). The difference between the groups 
below and above the median is significant in the case of stronger product market regulation (a 22% 
increase in the effect of density) and stronger firm cooperation (a 27% increase in the effect of 




                                                          




This paper has demonstrated that institutions have an impact on the direction of diversification in 
developed countries by investigating their ability to gain comparative advantage in new sectors that 
are close or far from what they already produce. While inspired by the VoC literature, we moved 
beyond the coarse distinction between LME and CME countries, and we used multiple institutional 
indicators. Our results showed that the role of relatedness as a driver of diversification into new 
sectors is stronger in presence of ‘non-market’ coordination institutions in the domains of labor 
relations, corporate governance relations, product market relations, and inter-firm relations. 
We contribute to the VoC literature by showing that institutions condition the direction of 
diversification, and not specialization patterns in countries. We demonstrated that countries with 
institutions associated to CME’s diversify into related products, not CM products, while countries 
with institutions typical of LME’s had a higher probability to move into more unrelated products, not 
LM products. A recent paper by Mindruta et al. (2014) shows that a similar evolutionary process 
takes place in the domain of patents, and that coordination institutions determine cross-country 
differences in explorative and exploitative innovation. 
The paper also contributes to the literature on related diversification, by explicitly introducing 
institutional elements. Our study confirms the strong path-dependence in the diversification process 
of countries emerging from previous work (Hausmann and Klinger, 2007; Boschma et al., 2013): the 
productive structure of the past keeps exerting its influence many years later. But on top of that, we 
could show that institutions matter for the type of diversification that occurs in countries, in terms of 
whether related rather than unrelated diversification prevails. Our paper provides an example of how 
institutions can be successfully integrated in evolutionary economic geography more in general, and 
in the literature on related diversification more in particular.  
There are obviously some aspects that we did not consider in this work and that are open for 
further research. First, it would be important to study the extent to which some institutions might be 
relevant only for some specific sectors, distinguishing high-tech from low-tech, for example, as 




sectoral institutions could actually be a driver for the emergence and success of some sectors. Second, 
we investigated the role of national institutions on the nature of diversification in countries. Boschma 
et al. (2013) actually showed that the effect of relatedness on diversification is stronger at the regional 
than at the national level, whereas regional institutions might exhibit higher variety and more 
dynamics than national institutions (Strambach, 2010). Therefore, it would be even more interesting 
to do the same type of analysis at the regional level (effect of regional institutions on regional 
diversification), or even better, to take a multi-scalar approach that assess the role of national and 
regional institutions on the diversification process in regions (Peck and Theodore, 2007). Another 
interesting aspect to investigate is the effect of institutional complementarities, with some sets of 
institutions that become relevant only when also other elements are present (Amable, 2000; Lipsey, 
2009). For instance, we know that institutional change has a limited effect if it does not change the 
nature of the complementarities (Hancké et al., 2007). Finally, an important issue to consider is the 
effect of institutional change on diversification, such as the tendency of market economies to become 
more market-oriented (Hall and Thelen, 2009) or to increase the importance of financial markets and 
values (Gospel et al., 2014). Studies on abrupt institutional change like the erosion of property rights 
or the transformation of a political system could also be relevant in this respect, as these could have 
long-lasting consequences on the process of industrial diversification in countries. 
 
References 
Abernathy, W.J., Utterback, J.M., 1978. Patterns of industrial innovation. Technology Review 80, 
40-47. 
Acemoglu, D., Akcigit, U., Celik, M.A., 2014. Young, restless and creative: Openness to disruption 
and creative innovations. PIER Working Paper No. 14-004, The Penn Institute for Economic 
Research, Philadelphia. 
Akkermans, D., Castaldi, C., Los, B., 2009. Do “liberal market economies” really innovate more 
radically than “coordinated market economies”? Hall and Soskice reconsidered. Research Policy 38, 
181-191. 
Allen, M., Funk, L., Tüselmann, H., 2006. Can variation in public policies account for differences in 




Amable, B., 2000. Institutional complementarity and diversity of social systems of innovation and 
production. Review of International Political Economy 7, 645-687. 
Angrist, J.D., Pischke, J.S, 2009. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Asheim, B.T, Coenen, L., 2006. Contextualising regional innovation systems in a globalising learning 
economy: On knowledge bases and institutional frameworks. Journal of Technology Transfer 31, 
163-173. 
Balassa, B., 1965. Trade liberalization and revealed comparative advantage. Manchester School of 
Economics and Social Studies 33, 99-123. 
Berger, S., 2013. Making in America. From Innovation to Market. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Boschma, R., Capone, G., 2014. Relatedness, diversification, and institutions. Paper Presented at the 
DRUID 2014 Society Conference, Copenhagen, June 16-18. 
Boschma, R., Capone, G., 2015. Relatedness and diversification in the EU-27 and ENP countries. 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, forthcoming. 
Boschma R., Frenken K., 2009. Some notes on institutions in evolutionary economic geography. 
Economic Geography 85, 151–158. 
Boschma, R., Frenken, K., 2011. Technological relatedness and regional branching, in: Bathelt, H., 
Feldman, M.P., Kogler, D.F. (Eds), Beyond Territory. Dynamic Geographies of Knowledge Creation, 
Diffusion, and Innovation. Routledge, New York, pp. 64-81. 
Boschma, R., Minondo, A., Navarro, M., 2013. The emergence of new industries at the regional level 
in Spain: A proximity approach based on product relatedness. Economic Geography 89, 29-51. 
Crescenzi, R., Rodríguez-Pose, A., 2011. Innovation and Regional Growth in the European Union. 
Springer, Berlin. 
Crouch, C., 2005. Capitalist Diversity and Change. Recombinant Governance and Institutional 
Entrepreneurs. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Deeg, R., Jackson, G., 2007. Towards a more dynamic theory of capitalist diversity. Socio-Economic 
Review 5, 149-180. 
Dosi, G., Pavitt, K., Soete, L., 1990. The Economics of Technical Change and International Trade. 
New York University Press, New York. 
Ergas, H., 1984. Why do some countries innovate more than others? Center for European Policy 
Studies, Brussles. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430184. 
Essleztbichler, J., 2013. Relatedness, industrial branching and technological cohesion in US 
metropolitan areas. Regional Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00343404.2013.806793. 




Feenstra, R.C., Lipsey, R.E., Deng, H., Ma, A.C., Mo, 2005. World trade flows: 1962-2000. NBER 
Working Paper No. 11040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Feldman, M.P., Massard, N. (Eds), 2002. Institutions and Systems in the Geography of Innovation. 
Kluwer Academic, Boston. 
Freeman, R.B., 2007. Labor market institutions around the world. NBER Working Paper No. 13242, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Gaulier, G., Zignago, S., 2010. BACI: International trade database at the product level. The 1994-
2007 version. CEPII Working Paper No. 2010-23, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales, Paris. 
Geffen, D.A., Kenyon, T., 2006. Heinz capitalism: How many varieties are there? An empirical 
reexamination of coordination mechanisms in advanced market economies. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005407. 
Gertler, M.S., 2010. Rules of the game: The place of institutions in regional economic change. 
Regional Studies 44, 1-15. 
Glaeser, E., La Porta, F., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2004. Do institutions cause growth? 
Journal of Economic Growth 9, 271-303. 
Gospel, H., 2013. Workforce development and skill formation: theory and practice, in: Benson, J., 
Gospel, H., Zhu, Y. (Eds), Workforce Development and Skill Formation in Asia. Routledge, London, 
pp. 12-39. 
Gospel, H., Pendleton, A., Vitols, S. (Eds), 2014. Financialization, New Investment Funds, and 
Labour. An International Comparison. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Greene, W., 2004. The behaviour of the maximum likelihood estimator of limited variable models in 
the presence of fixed effects. Econometrics Journal 7, 98-119. 
Hall, P.A., 2007. The evolution of varieties of capitalism in Europe, in Hancké, B., Rhodes, M., 
Thatcher, M. (Eds), 2007. Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and 
Complementarities in the European Economy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 39-85. 
Hall, P.A., Gingerich, D.W., 2009. Varieties of capitalism and institutional complementarities in the 
political economy: An empirical analysis. British Journal of Political Science 39, 449-482. 
Hall, P.A., Soskice, D., 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Hall, P.A., Thelen, K., 2009. Institutional change in varieties of capitalism. Socio-Economic Review 
7, 7-34. 
Hancké, B., Rhodes, M., Thatcher, M., 2007. Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, 




Hausmann, R., Klinger, B., 2007. The structure of the product space and the evolution of comparative 
advantage. CID Working Paper No. 146, Center for International Development, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Heckman, J., 1981. The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial conditions in 
estimating a discrete time-discrete data stochastic process, in: Manski, C., McFadden, D. (Eds), 
Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Herrmann, A.M., Peine, A., 2011. When “national innovation system” meet “varieties of capitalism” 
arguments on labour qualifications: On the skill types and scientific knowledge needed for radical 
and incremental product innovations. Research Policy 40, 687-701. 
Hicks, A., Kenworthy, L., 1998. Cooperation and political economic performance in affluent 
democratic capitalism. American Journal of Sociology 103, 1631-72.  
Hidalgo, C.A., Hausmann, R., 2009. The building blocks of economic complexity. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 106, 10570-10575. 
Hidalgo, C.A., Klinger, B., Barabàsi, A.L., Hausmann, R., 2007. The product space conditions the 
development of nations. Science 317, 482-487. 
Hollingsworth, R., 2009. The role of institutions and organizations in shaping radical scientific 
innovations, in: Magnusson, L., Ottosson, J. (Eds), The Evolution of Path Dependence. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, pp. 139-165. 
Jessop, B., 2011. Rethinking the diversity and varieties of capitalism: On variegated capitalism in the 
world market, in: Wood, G., Lane, C. (Eds), Capitalist Diversity and Diversity within Capitalism. 
Routledge, London, pp. 209-237. 
Klepper, S., 1996. Entry, exit, growth and innovation over the product life cycle. American Economic 
Review 86, 562-583. 
Klepper, S., 2002. The capabilities of new firms and the evolution of the US automobile industry. 
Industrial and Corporate Change 11, 645-666. 
Klepper, S., Simons, K.L., 2000. Dominance by birthright: Entry of prior radio producers and 
competitive ramifications in the U.S. television receiver industry. Strategic Management Journal 21, 
997-1016. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1998. Law and finance. Journal of 
Political Economy 106, 1113-1155. 
Leamer, E., 1984. Sources of Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Lipsey, R.G., 2009. Economic growth related to mutually interdependent institutions and technology. 
Journal of Institutional Economics 5, 259-288. 
Kumar, V., Mudambi, R., Gray, S., 2013. Internationalization, innovation and institutions: The 3 I's 





MacKinnon, D., Cumbers, A., Pyke, A., Birch, K., McMaster, R., 2009. Evolution in economic 
geography. Institutions, political economy and adaptation. Economic Geography 85, 129-150. 
Malerba, F. (Ed), 2004. Sectoral Systems of Innovation: Concepts, Issues and Analyses of Six Major 
Sectors in Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Martin, R., Sunley, P., 2006. Path dependence and regional economic evolution. Journal of Economic 
Geography 6, 395-437. 
Meelen, T., 2013. A dynamic analysis of the comparative advantage of Coordinated and Liberal 
Market Economies, Utrecht University, Utrecht. 
Menzel, M.P., Kammer, J., 2012. Industry evolution in varieties-of-capitalism: a survival analysis on 
wind turbine producers in Denmark and the USA. Papers in Evolutionary Economic Geography No. 
12.20, Department of Economic Geography, Utrecht University, Utrecht. 
Mindruta, D., Pimentel, J.A., Hoetker, G., 2014. Institutions and the direction of innovative search: 
change and persistence between and within countries. Paper Presented at the DRUID 2014 Society 
Conference, Copenhagen, June 16-18. 
Neffke, F., Henning, M., Boschma, R., 2011. How do regions diversify over time? Industry 
relatedness and the development of new growth paths in regions. Economic Geography 87, 237-265. 
Nelson, R.R., (Ed.) 1993. National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
Nicoletti, G., Scarpetta, S., Boylaud, O., 2000. Summary indicators of product market regulation with 
an extension to employment protection legislation. OECD Economics Department Working Papers 
No. 226, OECD, Paris. 
Pagano, M., Volpin, P., 2001. The political economy of corporate governance. CEPR Discussion 
Paper No. 2682, Center for Economic Policy Research, London. 
Parker, D., Kirkpatrick, C., 2012. The economic impact of regulatory policy: A literature review of 
quantitative evidence. OECD Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development Expert 
Paper No. 3, OECD, Paris. 
Pavitt, K., 1984. Sectoral patterns of technical change: Towards a taxonomy and a theory. Research 
Policy 13, 343-373. 
Peck, J., Theodore, N. 2007. Variegated capitalism. Progress in Human Geography 31, 731-772. 
Petralia, S., P. Balland and A. Morrison 2015. Climbing the ladder of technological development, 
working paper 
Riedl, M., Geishecker, I., 2014. Keep it simple: Estimation strategies for ordered response models 
with fixed effects. Journal of Applied Statistics 41, 2358-2374. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A., Di Cataldo, M., 2014. Quality of government and innovative performance in the 





Schneider, M.R., Paunescu, M., 2012. Changing varieties of capitalism and revealed comparative 
advantages from 1990 to 2005: A test of the Hall and Soskice claims. Socio-Economic Review 10, 
731-753. 
Schumpeter, J.A.,1939. Business Cycles. McGraw Hill, London. 
Strambach, S., 2010. Path dependence and path plasticity: the co-evolution of institutions and 
innovation – the German customized business software industry, in Boschma, R., Martin, R. (Eds), 
The Handbook of Evolutionary Economic Geography. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 406-431. 
Streeck, W., Thelen, K.A., 2005. Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political 
Economies. Oxford University Press,  
Taylor, M.Z., 2004. Empirical evidence against varieties of capitalism’s theory of technological 
innovation. International Organization 58, 601-631. 
Voigt, S., 2013. How (not) to measure institutions. Journal of Institutional Economics 9, 1-26. 
Woodruff, C., 2006. Measuring institutions, in Rose-Ackerman, S. (Ed), International Handbook on 







Determinants of Having a Comparative Advantage in the Future: 
Dummy Indicators of Varieties of Capitalism 
Institutions Indicator 
Original Dummy 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001) 
Indicator Measurement LME CME MME 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Model LPM LPM LPM 
D.V. CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 
CAt  0.654**  0.653**  0.653** 
 (0.011) (0.0109) (0.0111) 
Density on Current 0.148** 0.145** 0.146** 
 (0.0117) (0.0123) (0.011) 
Density on New 0.145** 0.136** 0.143** 
 (0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0075) 
LME * Density on Curr. -0.01   
 (0.0165)   
LME * Density on New -0.16   
 (0.0145)   
CME * Density on Curr.  0.005  
  (0.0139)  
CME * Density on New  0.015  
  (0.0129)  
MME * Density on Curr.   0.004 
   (0.0152) 
MME * Density on New   -0.002 
   (0.0174) 
LM Product * Density 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0056) 
CM Product * Density 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0032) 
    
Observations 85629 85629 85629 
Number of Clusters 23 23 23 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6241 0.6241 0.6241 
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
All models include country-year and product-year dummy variables. 







Determinants of Having a Comparative Advantage in the Future: 
Time-Varying Dummy Indicators of Varieties of Capitalism 
Institutions Indicator 
Time-Varying Dummy 
(Schneider and Paunescu, 2012) 
Indicator Measurement LME+ LMEE HYB CMEE CME+ 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM 
D.V. CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 
CAt 0.643** 0.643** 0.642** 0.643** 0.643** 
 (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.011) (0.0116) (0.0110) 
Density on Current 0.138** 0.136** 0.141** 0.136** 0.141** 
 (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.0101) 
Density on New 0.138** 0.137** 0.137** 0.133** 0.136** 
 (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0099) (0.01) (0.0095) 
LME+ * Density on Curr. 0.001     
 (0.0163)     
LME+ * Density on New -0.009     
 (0.0177)     
LMEE * Density on Curr.  0.007    
  (0.0146)    
LMEE * Density on New  -0.004    
  (0.0137)    
HYB * Density on Curr.   -0.018   
   (0.0232)   
HYB * Density on New   -0.006   
   (0.0197)   
CMEE * Density on Curr.    0.004  
    (0.0126)  
CMEE * Density on New    0.007  
    (0.0119)  
CME+ * Density on Curr.     -0.006 
     (0.0122) 
CME+ * Density on New     -0.002 
     (0.0128) 
LM Product * Density 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
CM Product * Density 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
      
Observations 100521 100521 100521 100521 100521 
Number of Clusters 27 27 27 27 27 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6032 0.6032 0.6033 0.6032 0.6032 
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
All models include country-year and product-year dummy variables. 








Determinants of Having a Comparative Advantage in the Future: 
Labor and Corporate Governance Indicators 
Institutions Indicator 
Labor Relation Index 
(Hall & Gingerich, 2009) 
Corp. Gov. Index 
(Hall & Gingerich, 2009) 
PCA Combination 
LRI and CGI 
Indicator Measurement Cts Med Cts Med Cts Med 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Model LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM 
D.V. CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 
CAt 0.659** 0.659** 0.659** 0.662** 0.659** 0.661** 
 (0.0113) (0.011) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0103) 
Density on Current 0.131** 0.134** 0.126** 0.139** 0.128** 0.138** 
 (0.0139) (0.0111) (0.0126) (0.0159) (0.0134) (0.0126) 
Density on New 0.119** 0.123** 0.116** 0.128** 0.116** 0.118** 
 (0.0122) (0.0112) (0.0132) (0.0099) (0.0133) (0.0085) 
LRI*Density on Curr. 0.017 0.012     
 (0.0209) (0.0132)     
LRI*Density on New 0.039* 0.032*     
 (0.0172) (0.012)     
CGI*Density on Curr.   0.022+ 0.002   
   (0.02) (0.0174)   
CGI*Density on New   0.039* 0.021+   
   (0.0195) (0.012)   
LGI*Density on Curr.     0.021 0.005 
     (0.0211) (0.0144) 
LGI*Density on New     0.041* 0.038** 
     (0.0194) (0.0109) 
LM Product * Density 0.0004 0.0002 0.001 0.0003 0.001 -0.0003 
 (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0066) 
CM Product * Density 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
       
Observations 74460 74460 74460 74460 74460 74460 
Number of Clusters 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6332 0.6332 0.6331 0.6332 0.6332 0.6333 
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
All models include country-year and product-year dummy variables. 








Determinants of Having a Comparative Advantage in the Future: 
Further Institutional Indicators 
Institutions Indicator PMR MA FCO VCT 
Indicator Measurement Cts Med Cts Med Cts Med Cts Med 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM 
D.V. CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 CAt+5 
CAt 0.657** 0.657** 0.66** 0.659** 0.665** 0.664** 0.656** 0.656** 
 (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0127) (0.0133) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0106) (0.0107) 
Density on Current 0.095** 0.131** 0.152** 0.143** 0.131** 0.137** 0.14** 0.147** 
 (0.0204) (0.0108) (0.0187) (0.0146) (0.0135) (0.0126) (0.0136) (0.0154) 
Density on New 0.09** 0.127** 0.157** 0.146** 0.121** 0.125** 0.179** 0.154** 
 (0.0214) (0.0068) (0.0095) (0.0092) (0.008) (0.008) (0.0184) (0.0113) 
PMR*Density on Curr. 0.032* 0.024+       
 (0.0144) (0.0132)       
PMR *Density on New 0.036* 0.028*       
 (0.0162) (0.0129)       
MA*Density on Curr.   -0.001 -0.007     
   (0.0008) (0.0148)     
MA*Density on New   -0.001* -0.013     
   (0.0005) (0.0159)     
FCO*Density on Curr.     0.034 0.015   
     (0.0341) (0.0183)   
FCO *Density on New     0.063** 0.034**   
     (0.017) (0.0122)   
VCT*Density on Curr.       0.006 -0.009 
       (0.0182) (0.0165) 
VCT *Density on New       -0.09* -0.023 
       (0.0361) (0.0151) 
LM Product * Density 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.0002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0065) (0.0065) 
CM Product * Density 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0036) 
         
Observations 74460 74460 74460 74460 67014 67014 74460 74460 
Number of Clusters 20 20 20 20 18 18 20 20 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6332 0.6332 0.6332 0.631 0.6465 0.6465 0.6332 0.6332 
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
All models include country-year and product-year dummy variables. 






Table A1  
Summary Statistics and Correlations  
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
CAt+5 (1) 0.279 0.4484 1                    
CAt (2) 0.276 0.4471 0.752 1                   
Density (3) 0.298 0.124 0.423 0.462 1                  
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 CM Product (5) 0.24 0.4272 0.034 0.04 0.029 
-
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0.727 1        
LRI (14) 0.517 0.2951 0.051 0.041 0.205 0 0 
-
0.854 
0.625 0.197 -0.69 
-
0.719 
0.398 0.494 0.48 1       








0.183 0.657 0.567 0.912 1      








0.297 0.589 0.536 0.978 0.978 1     








0.28 0.438 0.396 0.571 0.642 0.62 1    
MA (18) 16.31 9.331 -0.12 -0.1 
-
0.432 
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Descriptions of Institutional Indicators 
SHORT 
NAME 




Includes: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New 
Zealand, UK, USA. 




Includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland. 




Includes: France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey. 




Includes: Canada, UK, USA (1995, 1999, 
2005); Australia, New Zealand (1995, 1999);  
Ireland (1999); Denmark (1995, 2005);  
Switzerland (1999, 2005); Finland, 
Netherlands (1999). 
Schneider and Paunescu, 2012 
LMEE 
LME+ and LME-Like 
Economies 
Includes: LME+; Australia, New Zealand 
(2005); Ireland (1995, 2005); Switzerland 
(1995);  Denmark (1999); Sweden (1999, 
2005); Finland, Netherlands (2005); Spain 
(2005). 
Schneider and Paunescu, 2012 
HYB Hybrid Economies 
Includes: Hungary, Japan, Korea, Poland 
(1995, 1999, 2005); Norway (1999, 2005); 
Czech Republic, Italy (2005). 




Includes: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany 
(1995, 1999, 2005); Czech Republic, Italy 
(1995, 1999); Finland, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden (1995). 
Schneider and Paunescu, 2012 
CMEE 
CME* and State- 
Dominated Economies 
Includes: CME+; Greece, Portugal, Turkey 
(1995, 1999, 2005); Spain (1995, 1999). 
Schneider and Paunescu, 2012 
LRI Labor Relation Index 
Index obtained by applying factor analysis to 
labor relations indicators. 




Index obtained by applying factor analysis to 
corporate governance indicators. 
Hall and Gingerich, 2009 
LGI 
Combined Index of 
Labor Relations and 
Corporate Governance 
Principal component combination of Labor 
Relations Index and Corporate Governance 
Index. 




Summary measure of 17 product market 
regulation indicators in 1998. 




Ratio of M&A deals and total population (in 
millions), average between 1990 and 1997. 
Pagano and Volpin, 2001 
FCO Firm Cooperation 
Summary measure of firm-level cooperation, 
average between 1960-1989. 
Hicks and Kenworthy, 1998 
VCT Vocational Training 
Sum of the share of students enrolled in 
secondary vocational programs over all 
students enrolled in secondary programs and 
the share of students enrolled in tertiary 
vocational programs over all students enrolled 
in tertiary programs, average 1990-1994. 



















Diversification Patterns in Liberal Market (LM) and Coordinated Market (CM) Products 
 
 
 
 
 
